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Abstract— We analyze and design a control strategy for
nonlinear systems under Denial-of-Service attacks. Based on an
ISS-Lyapunov function analysis, we provide a characterization
of the maximal percentage of time during which feedback
information can be lost without resulting in instability of the
system. Motivated by the presence of a digital channel we
consider event-based controllers for which a minimal inter-
sampling time is explicitly characterized.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivated by interest in the analysis and control of critical
infrastructures such as power networks, supply chains and
transportation systems, recent years have witnessed increas-
ing research interests in large-scale engineered systems. To
achieve the prescribed control goal, these systems require
exchange of information that often occurs in digital form. In
turn this has triggered interest in control over communication
channels. One of the topics that has stimulated broad interest
is the so-called event-based control ([19]) in which sampling
times are designed in real-time with the ultimate goal of
saving communication resources while still guaranteeing the
control goal. Event-based control has found fertile ground
also in the area of cooperative control; e.g., see [18], [4].
A natural research question raises when dealing with con-
trol over a communication channel: whether or not stability
properties and performance are preserved in the presence
of loss of feedback information. This loss of information
could be due not only to malfunctioning but also to malicious
actions by an adversarial entity [1], [12]. In the latter case,
the assumption on the kind of information loss should be
kept to a minimum since intelligent adversaries might not
follow e.g. any statistical pattern. This aspect is in contrast
with other work where the loss of information is mainly due
to the unreliability of the communication channel [17].
Several contributions to the topic of stability/stabilization
in the presence of adversarial entities have been reported
in the last few years, with main emphasis on the so-called
Denial-of-Service (DoS), a class of attack strategies primarily
intended to affect the timeliness of information exchange
[3]. In [1], the authors address the problem of security
constrained optimal control for discrete-time linear systems
in which packets may be jammed by a malicious adversary,
and the goal is to find optimal control and attack strategies
assuming a maximum number of jamming actions over a
prescribed (finite) control horizon. A very similar scenario
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is considered in [10], where the problem of stabilizing
a discrete-time linear system under DoS is casted as a
dynamic zero-sum game. An interesting alternative scenario
is addressed in [8], where the authors consider the problem
of stability under periodic DoS for linear sampled-data
systems under state-feedback. The idea there is to identify
the jamming signal so as to restrict the information exchange
to the time intervals where no DoS occurs. This approach has
been then extended in [7] by considering energy-constrained,
but otherwise unknown DoS attacks.
In [5], [6], we addressed afresh the problem of stability
under energy-constrained, but unknown, DoS attacks within
the framework of linear sampled-data systems under state-
feedback. The analysis differs from the one in [7], [8] since
the goal is not to identify the jamming signal; rather, the
goal is to determine if stabilization is possible assuming
only a bound on the fraction of the time the jammer is
active. The considered approach, inspired by [19], consists
in a suitable logic that determines in real-time the frequency
of controller updates (the sampling times) depending on
the DoS occurrence. In particular, it enjoys the following
features:
i) It ensures global exponential stability of the closed-loop
system whenever the intervals over which communication is
possible are predominant with respect to the intervals over
which communication is denied;
ii) It allows for the state-feedback matrix to be designed
in accordance with any control design method, robustness
against DoS being achieved thanks to the sampling logic;
iii) It is resilient since the sampling rate varies depending
on the DoS occurrence;
iv) It allows for an explicit characterization of convergence
rate, minimal inter-sampling time, and ratios between the
“active” and “sleeping” periods of DoS which do not destroy
closed-loop stability;
v) It is flexible enough so as to allow the designer to
choose from several implementation options that can be used
to trade-off performance vs. communication resources.
The objective of this paper is to initiate the investigation of
similar ideas for nonlinear systems. Although we follow the
line of arguments of [5], [6], a few of the steps we take are
very peculiar to nonlinear systems, making the extension far
from straightforward and deserving attention on its own right.
It is shown that under certain additional conditions, which
are basically needed to avoid finite-escape times phenomena
during DoS, semi-global asymptotic stability can be still
ensured. The analysis combines arguments from event-based
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control and ISS control Lyapunov functions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II we introduce the framework of interest and
provide an overview of the problem. In Section III, we
describe the considered class of DoS attacks and provide
some preliminary stability results. The main result with a
characterization of the class of DoS signals under which
stability is preserved is given in Section IV. In Section V,
we provide a characterization of the achieved minimal inter-
sampling rate. Section VI provides concluding remarks and
outlines future research directions.
II. FRAMEWORK AND PROBLEM OVERVIEW
In this paper we consider nonlinear systems of the form
x˙ = f(x, u) (1)
for which we assume the existence of a smooth state feed-
back u = k(x) which renders the closed-loop system
x˙ = f(x, k(x+ e))
ISS with respect to measurement errors e in the sense that
there exist a smooth function V and class K∞ functions
α1, α2, γ2 such that
α1(‖x‖) ≤ V (x) ≤ α2(‖x‖)
∇V (x)f(x, k(x+ e)) ≤ −λV (x) + γ2(‖e‖),
(2)
with λ > 0.
The control action is implemented via a sample-and-hold
device. In a nominal situation, given a sequence of times
{tk}, k ∈ N, where t0 := 0 by convention, the control action
is such that
unom(t) = k(x(tk)), for all t ∈ [tk, tk+1). (3)
The mechanism that generates this sequence of times will be
specified in the sequel. By nominal situation is meant that at
each time tk at which the actuator needs to update the control
value, it correctly receives the sampled value k(x(tk)).
The focus of this paper is on a scenario that is different
from the nominal one, namely one in which there might be
times in the sequence {tk} at which the control value cannot
be updated because no information regarding k(x(tk)) is
received by the actuator. This loss of information can be
caused by several factors, such as a defective communication
channel or as a consequence of the action of an adversarial
entity. To fix the ideas, we focus in the sequel on the
latter scenario, and refer to this interruption of information
transmission from the sensor to the actuator as Denial of
Service or DoS.
Let {hn}, n ∈ N, h0 ≥ 0, represent a sequence of “pos-
itive edge-triggering” times which define the time intervals
at which a DoS attack is occurring. Namely, at hn the n-th
DoS attack becomes active (no communication is possible
from the sensors to the actuators), while at hn + τn, with
τn > 0 the duration of the n-th DoS attack during which
information transmission is not possible, the DoS attack
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of the closed-loop system under DoS on the
communication channels.
ends (communication is possible from the sensors to the
actuators). In formula,
Hn = [hn, hn + τn[ (4)
represents the n-th DoS time-interval.
We then assume that, in the presence of DoS, the actuator
generates an input that is based on the most recently received
control signal. Specifically, denote the set of time-instants
where communication is possible by
Θ(t) := [0, t] \
⋃
n∈N
Hn (5)
where \ means relative complement. Accordingly, the control
input applied to the process at each time instant can be
expressed as
u(t) = k(x(tk(t))) (6)
where
k(t) :=
 −1, if Θ(t) = ∅
sup { k ∈ N | tk ∈ Θ(t) } , otherwise
(7)
denote the last (up to the current time) successful control
update. Notice that h0 = 0 implies k(0) = −1, which raises
the question of assigning a value to the control input when
communication is not possible at the process start-up. In this
respect, we assume that when h0 = 0 then u(0) = 0, and
we let x(t−1) := 0 for notational consistency.
The problem of interest is to find suitable control update
rules, i.e. logics for generating {tk}k∈N that are resilient
against DoS, while ensuring the existence of a minimal
control update inter-execution time. The requirement of
resilience calls for logics capable not only to tolerate but
also to counteract the occurrence of DoS. On the other
hand, requiring the existence of a minimal control update
inter-execution time is fundamental in order for the control
architecture to be implementable on digital platforms.
The following definitions are key for the developments of
the paper.
Definition 1 System Σ, composed of (1) in closed-loop with
(6) is said to have a semi-globally asymptotically stable
origin if there exists a KL function β such that, for all R > 0,
the solution to Σ satisfies
‖x(t)‖ ≤ β(‖x(0)‖, t) (8)
for all t ∈ R≥0 and for all x(0) ∈ Rnx such that ‖x(0)‖ ≤
R, where ‖ · ‖ stands for Euclidean norm. 
Definition 2 A control update sequence {tk} is said to occur
at a finite sampling rate if there exists an ε ∈ R>0 such that
∆k := tk+1 − tk ≥ ε (9)
for all k ∈ N. 
Remark 1 It is worth pointing out that the synthesis of
control laws achieving ISS is in general a nontrivial task.
Nonetheless, the literature on the topic is quite vast. In
particular, contributions centered around the concept of ISS-
control Lyapunov functions can be found in [9], [20], [11];
see also [21] for relevant design examples. 
III. A PREPARATORY ANALYSIS
In this section, we make some considerations regarding
the considered class of DoS attacks and provide some
preliminary stability results.
A. DoS attacks
In general the uncontrolled system (1) (i.e. with u = 0)
might have an unstable dynamics and also exhibit finite-
escape times. This suggests two facts: (i) the duration of
a DOS attack cannot be arbitrarily large; and (ii) conditions
on the systems and of the DoS attack must make sure that
information is delivered before the occurrence of a possible
finite-escape time.
Given a sequence {hn}, let
Ξ(t) :=
⋃
n∈N
Hn
⋂
[0, t] (10)
denote the total interval of DoS up to the current time, where,
given an interval I , let |I| denote its length. The following
assumptions are then considered.
Assumption 1 The DoS sequence {hn}, n ∈ N, is such that
limn→∞ hn = ∞. Moreover, there exist constants κ ∈ R≥0
and τ ∈ R>0 such that
|Ξ(t)| ≤ κ+ t
τ
(11)
for all t ∈ R≥0. 
Assumption 2 There exists a positive value µ such that
γ2(4r) ≤ µα1(r) (12)
for all r ∈ R≥0. 
In accordance with (i), limiting the duration of DoS
is necessary for closed-loop stability to be conceptually
achievable. Assumption 1 captures well this prescription as
it requires the existence of a bound on the fraction of time
in which DoS is active. On the other hand, no conditions
are imposed on the DoS “structure”: first, DoS is allowed to
occur aperiodically; second, the duration of any two different
DoS intervals need not be equal to one another.
On the other hand, the role of Assumption 2 is that of
limiting the rate of divergence of the process states during
the time intervals over which the control action cannot be
updated. In this connection, as will become apparent in
the sequel, Assumption 2 ensures that over such intervals
the rate of divergence of the process states is at most
exponential, which guarantees the absence of finite-escape
times phenomena. Notice that when the process dynamics
are linear, Assumption 2 is always satisfied.
B. Ideal sampling logic and preliminary analysis
Given Assumptions 1 and 2, one expects that stability is
not destroyed if the intervals over which communication is
possible are predominant with respect to the intervals over
which communication is denied. However, proving this fact
is far from straightforward within the classical framework
of nonlinear sampled-data systems ([15], [13], [14], [2]).
Even more importantly, periodic sampling strategies hamper
the possibility of increasing the closed-loop robustness by
adapting the sampling rate to the DoS occurrence. As shown
next, the use of aperiodic sampling strategies as introduced
by [19] provides a convenient framework to work with, in
terms of both ease of analysis and effectiveness.
Consider the system Σ composed of (1) in closed-loop
with (6), namely
x˙(t) = f(x(t), k(x(tk(t))), t ∈ [tk(t), tk(t)+1).
Let
e(t) := x(tk(t))− x(t) (13)
be the measurement error induced by the sampling, with
e(tk(t)) = 0 by definition. System Σ can be therefore written
as
x˙(t) = f(x(t), k(x(t) + e(t))), t ∈ [tk(t), tk(t)+1).
Consider next the following ideal sampling logic. Given a
sampling instant tk:
i) if tk does not belong to Ξ(t), then the next sampling
instant tk+1 is defined as the infimal time larger than tk such
that the condition
γ2(4‖e(t)‖) ≤ λ(1− c)V (x(t)), (14)
with c ∈ (0, 1), is violated;
ii) if instead tk belongs to some DoS interval Hn, then
the next sampling instant tk+1 is defined as hn + τn.
This logic ensures that (14) holds true for all t ∈ Θ(t).
Unfortunately, it is ideal in the sense that it cannot be imple-
mented over digital platforms. In fact, because of the possible
aperiodic nature of DoS, it is conceptually impossible to
foresee when Dos will cease, and, hence, it is impossible to
implement point ii). Nonetheless, at this stage of analysis,
it is convenient to focus on this logic. Variants that are
implementable over digital platforms will be discussed in
Sections IV and V.
We are now in the position to provide a preliminary
closed-loop stability analysis. The underlying idea can be
described as follows: we decompose the time axis into the
sets Θ(t) and Ξ(t). Under the considered logic, (14) holds by
construction over Θ(t). In turns, this ensures that (2) satisfies
a dissipation-like inequality. On the other hand, over Ξ(t),
(14) need not hold and the closed-loop system might exhibit
divergence trends. Overall, the closed-loop dynamics can be
therefore viewed as those of a hybrid system, where one
switches between stable and unstable modes. The idea is then
to determine conditions under which the stable behavior is
predominant with respect to the unstable one.
We make these considerations precise. First notice that, as
an immediate consequence of (14), for all t ∈ Θ(t), we have
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ −cλV (x) =: −ω1V (x(t)).
On the other hand, for all t ∈ Hn = [hn, hn + τn] for some
n ∈ N, we have that
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ −λV (x(t)) + γ2(‖e(t)‖).
We would like to bound the growth of e(t) as a function of
V (x(t)). Recall that
‖e(t)‖ ≤ ‖x(tk(hn))− x(t)‖ ≤ ‖x(tk(hn))‖+ ‖x(t)‖.
To bound ‖x(tk(hn))‖, we need to introduce an appropriate
lemma.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 2, the state x(t) of system
(1) under the control update rule (14) and sample-and-hold
feedback control (6) satisfies
‖x(tk(hn))‖ ≤
1
4
γ−12 (λ(1− c)V (x(hn)))+
1
4
γ−12 (µV (x(hn)))
(15)
over the domain of existence of the solution x.
The proof of the result is given in the Appendix.
Notice that
γ2(‖e(t)‖) ≤ γ2(2‖x(tk(hn))‖) + γ2(2‖x(t)‖)
where we have exploited the inequality γ2(a+b) ≤ γ2(2a)+
γ2(2b). From (15), we obtain
γ2(2‖x(tk(hn))‖) ≤ γ2
(
1
2γ
−1
2 (λ(1− c)V (x(hn)))+
1
2γ
−1
2 (µV (x(hn)))
) ≤ (λ(1− c) + µ)V (x(hn))
On the other hand
γ2(2‖x(t)‖) ≤ γ2(2α−11 (V (x(t)))) ≤ µV (x(t))
where the last inequality descends from (12).
Hence, for all t ∈ Hn, we have
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ −λV (x(t)) + γ2(‖e(t)‖)
≤ (µ− λ)V (x(t)) + (λ(1− c) + µ)V (x(hn)).
For those t ∈ Hn such that V (x(hn)) ≤ V (x(t)),
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ (2µ− cλ)V (x(t)) < ω2V (x(t)), (16)
with ω2 := λ(1− c) + 2µ, while for those t ∈ Hn such that
V (x(hn)) > V (x(t)),
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ (λ(1− c) + 2µ)V (x(hn)) = ω2V (x(hn)).
(17)
Inequalities (16) and (17) can be combined to prove the
following:
Theorem 1 Consider the control system Σ composed of
(1) in closed-loop with (6), under DoS attacks satisfying
Assumption 1, and with control update rule defined in (14).
Let Assumption 2 hold.
If the parameter τ in (11) satisfies
τ >
ω1
ω1 + ω2
=
cλ
λ+ 2µ
, (18)
where
ω1 = cλ, ω2 = λ(1− c) + 2µ,
then any solution to Σ satisfies the inequality
‖x(t)‖ ≤ α−11
(
eκ(ω1+ω2) e−[ω1−(ω1+ω2)/τ ] tα2(‖x(0)‖)
)
for all t ≥ 0.
We refer the reader to the Appendix for a proof of the
theorem.
Remark 2 The result proves global asymptotic stability. In
fact, the need to restrict the set of initial conditions within
a ball of arbitrary large radius, thus obtaining a semi-global
asymptotic stabilizability result, becomes apparent when we
prove in Section V that the sequence of control update times
generated by (14) occurs at a finite rate.
IV. DOS-INDUCED ACTUATION DELAY
The analysis of the previous section rests upon the fulfill-
ment of condition (14). In practice the sequence of control
update times occurs at a finite sampling rate. This has
a consequence on the actual duration of the DoS. As a
matter of fact, when a sensor attempts to transmit and
no acknowledgement is received due to the attack, it will
repeat the transmission attempts until the transmission is
successful. Due to the finite transmission rate, even when
transmission becomes possible, there will be a delay from the
time the DoS attack is over and the time the transmission can
successfully occur. This delay causes a prolongation of the
DoS interval that affects the stability result of the previous
section. In this section, after recalling some notation from
[5], [6], we provide a stabilization result that takes into
account such a prolongation of the DoS attack. In other
words, we remove the second simplifying assumption stated
in ii) after (14).
Consider a control update sequence {tk} along with a DoS
sequence {hn}, and let
Sn := {k ∈ N | tk ∈ Hn} (19)
denote the set of integers associated with an attempt to update
the control action during Hn. Accordingly, by defining
∆Sn := sup
k∈Sn
∆k (20)
then
H¯n := [hn, hn + τn + ∆Sn [ (21)
will provide an upper bound on the n-th time interval over
which the control action is not updated, while
Ξ¯(t) :=
⋃
n∈N
H¯n
⋂
[0, t] (22)
will provide an upper bound on the total interval up to the
current time over which the control action is not updated.
Equation (21) essentially models the additional delay in the
control update that may arise under finite sampling rate.
We are now ready to state a version of Theorem 1 in which
the DoS-attack-induced delay is taken into account.
Theorem 2 Consider the control system Σ composed of
(1) in closed-loop with (6), under DoS attacks satisfying
Assumption 1, and with control update rule defined in (14).
Let Assumption 2 hold.
If the parameter τ in (11) satisfies
τ >
cλ
λ+ 2µ
(
1 +
∆∗
τ∗
)
, (23)
where
∆∗ := sup
n∈N
∆Sn (24)
and
τ∗ := inf
n∈N
τn > 0, (25)
then the inequality
‖x(t)‖ ≤ α−11
(
γe−βtα2(‖x(0)‖)
)
(26)
holds for all t ≥ 0, where
γ = eκ(λ+2µ)(1+
∆∗
τ∗ ), β =
(
cλ− λ+ 2µ
τ
(
1 +
∆∗
τ∗
))
and the parameters κ, λ, µ, are as in (11), (2) and (12),
respectively.
Proof. For any t ∈ R≥0, the Lyapunov function evolves
as V˙ (x(s)) ≤ −ω1V (x(s)) if s 6∈ Ξ(t) and as V˙ (x(s)) ≤
ω2V (x(s)) if s ∈ Ξ(t). Hence
V (x(t)) ≤ e−ω1t+(ω1+ω2)|Ξ(t)|V (x(t0)).
In [6], Theorem 2, the following estimate of
∣∣Ξ(t)∣∣ is
provided:
|Ξ¯(t)| ≤
(
κ+
t
τ
)(
1 +
∆∗
τ∗
)
(27)
Hence,
V (x(t)) ≤ e−
(
ω1−ω1+ω2τ
(
1+∆∗
τ∗
))
t+κ(ω1+ω2)
(
1+∆∗
τ∗
)
V (x(t0)).
The thesis now follows immediately under the stated assump-
tions and bearing in mind that ω1 = cλ, ω2 = λ(1− c)+2µ.

Remark 3 Theorem 2 differs from Theorem 1 not only
because of ∆∗ but also due to the presence of τ∗. This
has a very intuitive explanation. In fact, in the ideal case
considered in Theorem 1, ∆∗ = 0 since a control update can
always occur as soon as DoS is over. Under finite sampling
rate, each DoS interval will instead possibly introduce an
additional delay in the control update. This also points out
that, given two DoS sequences of equal total length, the one
composed of more intervals having smaller duration will be
more critical for stability, since it will potentially deny more
communications attempts. 
V. FINITE SAMPLING RATE
Until now in the investigation we have been implicitly
assuming that the sampling sequence generated by the rule
(14) occur at a finite sampling rate. In this section we inves-
tigate conditions under which such assumption is actually
met in practice. To this end, we restrict the set of initial
conditions for the process. In fact, we say that the solutions
to the control system Σ composed of (1) in closed-loop with
(6), under DoS attacks satisfying Assumption 1, and with
control update rule defined in (14), have ([16]) a semi-global
uniform finite sampling rate if for every R > 0 and for every
DoS sequence satisfying Assumption 1, there exists εR > 0
such that any solution to Σ starting in the ball BR(0) of
radius R and center the origin has an associated control
update sequence {tk} that for all k ∈ N satisfies (9) with
ε replaced by εR > 0.
Let R be an arbitrary positive number such that ‖x(0)‖| ≤
R. Motivated by the bound in (34), we introduce the balls
X = Bα−11 (γα2(R))(0) ⊂ R
n, E = B2α−11 (γα2(R))(0) ⊂ R
n .
Notice that these balls are known a priori since their radius
depend on quantities that are fixed in advance.
Assume that the vector field f(x, k(x + e)) is locally Lip-
schitz with respect to the variables (x, e), and let L be the
Lipschitz constant such that
‖f(x, k(x+ e))‖ ≤ L(‖x‖+ ‖e‖), for all (x, e) ∈ X × E .
(28)
The first fact that we recall is that as far as x ∈ X ,
then e ∈ E . Therefore, denoted by σ the positive constant
whose inverse is the Lipschitz constant of the function
α−11 (
1
λ(1−c)γ2(4‖e‖)) on E (under the assumption that the
function is locally Lipschitz), we have that
α−11 (
1
λ(1− c)γ2(4‖e‖)) ≤
1
σ
‖e‖, e ∈ E . (29)
Hence, as far as x(t) ∈ X , any sequence {tk} generated by
the triggering rule
‖e(t)‖ ≤ σ‖x(t)‖, t ∈ [tk, tk+1] (30)
implies that (14) is satisfied as well, that is
γ2(4‖e(t)‖) ≤ λ(1− c)‖x(t)‖, t ∈ [tk, tk+1].
Now we prove that with a triggering rule as in (30), the
requirement tk+1 − tk ≥ ε for all k ∈ N is actually met. To
show this, we study the evolution of e(t) for t ∈ [tk, tk+1[.
Observe that
e˙(t) = −f(x, k(x+ e))
implies
e(t) ≤ −
∫ t
tk
f(x(s), k(x(s) + e(s)))ds
and hence
‖e(t)‖ ≤
∫ t
tk
L(‖x(s)‖+ ‖e(s)‖)ds.
Since ‖x(s)‖ ≤ ‖x(tk)‖+ ‖e(s)‖, we also have
‖e(t)‖ ≤ L‖x(tk)‖(t− tk) +
∫ t
tk
2L‖e(s)‖ds.
Applying Gronwall-Bellman’s inequality and after standard
but lengthy manipulations, one arrives at
‖e(t)‖ ≤ 1
2
(
e2L(t−tk) − 1
)
‖x(tk)‖.
Let g(τ) := 12
(
e2Lτ − 1). Since ‖x(tk)‖ ≤ ‖e(t)‖+‖x(t)‖,
for all t ≥ tk such that g(t − tk) < 1, then the previous
inequality is equivalent to
‖e(t)‖ ≤ g(t− tk)
1− g(t− tk)‖x(t)‖.
Now,
g(t− tk) < 1 and g(t− tk)
1− g(t− tk) ≤ σ
if and only if
e2L(t−tk) < min{3, 3σ + 1
σ + 1
}
or equivalently
t− tk < 1
2L
ln
(
3σ + 1
σ + 1
)
.
Thus condition (30) is not violated until at least
1
2L
ln
(
3σ + 1
σ + 1
)
units of time have elapsed. In other words, any sequence
of sampling times generated by the triggering rule (30) or
(14) occurs at a finite sampling rate, that is (9) holds, with
ε replaced by εR and εR = 12L ln
(
3σ + 1
σ + 1
)
.
The discussion allows us to draw the following conclusion:
Theorem 3 Consider system (1) in closed loop with the
control (6), under DoS attacks satisfying Assumption 1, and
with control update rule defined in (14). Let Assumption 2
hold. Then, given any R > 0, if the parameter τ in (11)
satisfies
τ >
cλ
λ+ 2µ
(
1 +
∆∗
τ∗
)
, (31)
where
∆∗ := sup
n∈N
∆Sn (32)
and
τ∗ := inf
n∈N
τn > 0, (33)
then the inequality
‖x(t)‖ ≤ α−11
(
γe−βtα2(‖x(0)‖)
)
(34)
holds for all t ≥ 0 and for all ‖x(0)‖ ≤ R, where
γ = eκ(λ+2µ)(1+
∆∗
τ∗ ), β =
(
cλ− λ+ 2µ
τ
(
1 +
∆∗
τ∗
))
,
and the parameters κ, λ, µ, are as in (11), (2), (12), respec-
tively. Moreover, the control update rule has a semi-global
uniform finite sampling rate and (9) holds for each k ∈ N
with with ε replaced by εR and εR = 12L ln
(
3σ+1
σ+1
)
. 
There is a clear trade-off between the sampling rate and
the DoS attacks that the system can tolerate. In fact, the
minimum inter-sampling time εR depends on both σ and
L. In turn, these parameters depend on the radius of the
compact set X . This radius is affected by the parameter γ:
the larger is γ the larger is the radius. Now, γ grows with κ
that appears in the description of the DoS signals, modeling
possible occurrence of large intervals of DoS attacks at initial
times. Thus, a sustained attack at initial times might lead to
a small minimum inter sampling-time. On the other hand
the parameter τ that accounts for the percentage of time for
which an attack takes place depend on both the data of the
nonlinear system under control and the characteristic of the
DoS attack signal.
The result gives an indication on how to implement
event-triggered control to stabilize nonlinear systems in the
presence of DoS attacks. Event-triggered control requires
continuous monitoring of the state x(t) and can be resource-
consuming. Alternative implementations in the spirit of Sec-
tion 4.2 in [6] will be investigated in future versions of this
work.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The paper investigates the design of event-based control
strategies for nonlinear systems in the presence of DoS
attacks that interrupts the flow of information from the
sensors to the actuators. The DoS signal attack is modeled
at a fairly general level that we believe allows for the
inclusion of several interesting scenarios. Relations between
the sampling frequency, the data of the nonlinear systems
under control and the features of the DoS attack signal have
been revealed.
The main working assumption is Assumption 2 whose role
is to prevent the occurrence of finite escape times. It therefore
restricts the class of nonlinear systems but allows for a
less complicated analysis. Clearly, removing this assumption
requires to restrict the class of DoS attacks the system
can tolerate: if the systems undergoes prolonged attacks, it
will evolve in open loop for long time intervals facing the
possible occurrence of a finite escape time. This alternative
formulation may be worth of investigation.
In future work, more attention will be given to the actual
implementation of our resilient control and in particular to
its connections with other event-based approaches such as
self-triggered control. Relevant case studies to assess the
effectiveness of our approach are also part of our future
research plan. Whether our method can deal with attack
scenarios different from DoS attacks is a topic worth of
investigation as well.
Robustness of the proposed resilient control (as well as of
its linear counterpart studied in [5], [6]) to external distur-
bances in an ISS sense is a very interesting and challenging
research topic that will be tackled in the future.
Our initial interest for resilient control was motivated by
distributed control strategies for dynamical networks in a
cyberphysical environment (see e.g. [4]). We believe that our
technique can be extended to distributed resilient control and
can be a very fertile research ground.
VII. APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1 Recall that e(t) = x(tk(hn)) − x(t)
by definition, so that
‖x(tk(hn))‖ − ‖x(hn)‖ ≤ ‖e(hn)‖
≤ 1
4
γ−12 (λ(1− c)V (x(hn)))
where the second inequality descends from the control update
rule (14). Hence
‖x(tk(hn))‖ ≤
1
4
γ−12 (λ(1− c)V (x(hn))) + ‖x(hn)‖.
On the other hand
‖x(hn)‖ ≤ α−11 (V (x(hn))) ≤
1
4
γ−12 (µV (x(hn))),
where the second inequality is implied by condition (12).
Combining the two inequalities above the thesis descend. 
Proof of Theorem 1 For any t ∈ R≥0, the Lyapunov
function evolves as V˙ (x(s)) ≤ −ω1V (x(s)) if s 6∈ Ξ(t) and
V˙ (x(s)) ≤ ω2V (x(s)) if s ∈ Ξ(t). Hence
V (x(t)) ≤ e−ω1(t−|Ξ(t)|)eω2|Ξ(t)|V (x(t0))
≤ e−ω1t+(ω1+ω2)|Ξ(t)|V (x(t0)).
Bearing in mind Assumption 1, and in particular condition
(11), it follows that
V (x(t)) ≤ e−(ω1−(ω1+ω2)τ)t+κ(ω1+ω2)V (x(t0)).
The thesis now follows immediately under the stated assump-
tions. 
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